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INTRODUCTION 
This Court correctly determined that Mr. Wardrop is not 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits because Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively applies to bar his untimely claim 
for medical expenses. Section 35-1-99(2) cannot be characterized 
as substantive merely because it precludes claims for medical 
expenses brought after a certain time period. Section 35-1-99(2) 
is a statute of limitations. It prescribes the legal procedure 
for obtaining redress --no claimant may pursue the substantive 
remedy of medical expenses benefits unless he follows the 
procedure of filing a claim within three years after the date of 
the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation. 
This Court also acted appropriately in reversing the 
Industrial Commission's award of temporary total disability 
benefits since §35-1-98 (2) (1994) precludes Mr. Wardrop's untimely 
claim. The Industrial Commission is estopped from arguing that 
Brown & Root Industrial Service ("Brown & Root") waived its right 
to contest the award on appeal. The Industrial Commission could 
have filed an appellee's brief with this Court that raised this 
argument, but it chose not to do so. Now that this Court has 
issued an opinion in this case that the Commission deems 
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unfavorable, the Commission's after-the-fact protest of waiver 
falls on its own sword. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT §35-1-99(1988) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY 
TO BAR MR. WARDROP'S CLAIM FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
In determining that §35-1-99(1988) is a procedural statute 
with retroactive application, this Court's analysis was simple: 
this Court has previously held §35-1-99 to be a statute of 
limitations. Brown & Root Industrial Service v. Industrial 
Comm'n.. 905 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1995), citing Avis v. Board of 
Review, 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App., 1992), cert, denied, 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Statutes of limitations are considered to 
affect only procedural rights and therefore have retroactive 
application. Id. at 307-08, citing Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. 
Pinaree & Dahle. Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994). 
The Industrial Commission does not deny that §35-1-99(1988) 
is a statute of limitations in its Petition for Rehearing. 
Neither does it contest that statutes of limitations have been 
viewed as procedural under Utah law. Rather, it contends that 
this statute of limitations is substantive because the 1988 
amendment decreased the time in which an injured worker could 
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bring a claim for medical benefits. (Petition for Rehearing at 
8) . 
A statute of limitations does not become substantive merely 
because it shortens the time in which a substantive claim must be 
brought. By defining time limits, statutes of limitations set 
forth the procedure by which a substantive claim must be 
initiated. In Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc. v. Crouch, 773 P.2d 
947(Alaska 1989), the court rejected an injured worker's argument 
that a statutory amendment shortening the time in which claimants 
must request a hearing with the Workers' Compensation Board, 
enacted after the date of injury, was substantive. The court 
applied the amendment retroactively, explaining that: 
[the claimant] argues here that because the change in [the 
statute] "results in the absence of any effective remedy to 
enforce a substantive right," the change should be treated 
as substantive. But in deciding whether a change is 
substantive in character, it will hardly suffice that a new 
rule has proved dispositive in a particular case: if 
ignored, nearly any procedural rule can play a role in the 
disposition of a case....The claim has faltered on the two-
year limit not because it was a significant obstacle, but 
because [the claimant] failed to pay it any heed. 
Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc. v. Crouch, 773 P.2d at 949. 
Similarly, the court in Harrelson v. Industrial Com'n. of 
Arizona, 697 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. App. 1984), considered the 
retroactive application of a statutory amendment giving workers' 
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compensation claimants one year from the date of injury in which 
to file a claim. While the court observed that retroactive 
application would operate to destroy "what previously may have 
been a claim of continued vitality/' this did not mean that it 
would operate to destroy a vested right. Harrelson. 697 P.2d at 
1123. The court affirmed the Industrial Commission's dismissal 
of the late claim on the ground that the statute was a procedural 
law prescribing the method of enforcing substantive rights and 
therefore applied retroactively. Id. at 1122. See also 
Oestreich v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 822 P.2d 1264, 1266 
(Wash. App. 1992) (limitations period for making claims for 
adjustment of workers' compensation benefits does not eliminate 
ability to make claims and applies retroactively). 
This Court correctly recognized the procedural, and 
therefore retroactive, nature of §35-1-99(1988). The statute 
simply sets forth a time procedure for filing medical expenses 
claims; it does not completely destroy a claimant's ability to 
seek medical expenses benefits. Mr. Wardrop's award was properly 
reversed for untimeliness. 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION IS ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING THAT BROWN & ROOT WAIVED 
ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE AWARD OF TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
This Court appropriately reversed the Commission's award of 
temporary total disability benefits to Mr. Wardrop on the basis 
that this claim was untimely under §35-1-98(2). In its Petition 
for Rehearing, the Industrial Commission claims that Brown & Root 
contested this award for the first time on appeal. 
This Court was free to address the Commission's award of 
temporary total disability benefits on appeal, having received no 
objection during appellate briefing to this Court's consideration 
of the award. The Commission notes in its Petition for Rehearing 
that it received Brown & Root's appellate brief on March 26, 
1995. While the Commission laments that the deadline for filing 
a responsive brief had expired by this time, nothing prevented 
the Commission from requesting an extension of time in which to 
submit an appellee's brief on the ground that it received the 
appellant's brief late. This Court issued its opinion nearly 
seven months later, but during that time, the Commission chose 
not to file an appellee's brief. The Commission had several 
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months in which to raise its claim that Brown & Root was 
contesting the award of temporary total disability benefits for 
the first time on appeal, but it elected to remain silent. 
The Commission's present protest of waiver comes only after 
this Court has issued an opinion in this case that the Commission 
views as unfavorable. The Commission now seeks to reopen the 
case and oppose Brown & Root's appeal for the first time, in the 
hopes of achieving a more favorable result the second time 
around. The Commission had its chance to claim waiver, and the 
opportunity has passed. It is estopped from raising waiver for 
the first time on a Petition for Rehearing. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
This Court's opinion in Brown & Root Industrial Service v. 
Industrial Comm'n.. is correct in all respects. In addition to 
the arguments presented above in support of this Court's opinion, 
Brown & Root incorporates the arguments presented in its 
principal brief on appeal. Brown & Root requests that this Court 
deny the Commission's Petition for Rehearing. Should this Court 
grant the Petition for Rehearing, Brown & Root asks that this 
Court also consider the second issue raised in Brown & Root's 
appeal, which this Court did not reach in light of the 
-6-
disposition of the case: whether the Commission should have 
submitted to a medical panel the issue of the medical cause of 
Mr. Wardrop's present need for knee surgery. 
DATED this J?cL day of January, 1996. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
— T^^fc^rA, 
a r t L. Poelman 
iilianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Pe t i t ione r s 
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